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CRIMINAL LAW: LOWERING THE THRESHOLD FOR
KIDNAPPING TO FACILITATE A FELONY
Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)
Within minutes petitioner attacked, dragged and raped two women, for
which he was convicted of two counts each of sexual battery' and kidnapping
to facilitate a felony. 2 He sexually assaulted the first woman after dragging her
from her office desk in front of a large window to the rear of the office, and
again after forcing her into a nearby restroom.3 Fleeing into a residential area,
petitioner broke into a home where he attacked a second woman in the
kitchen and violently dragged her into a bedroom to rape her.4 Petitioner
appealed his multiple convictions to the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal,' claiming that the asportation of both victims was merely "incidental"
to the sexual batteries and, therefore, could not constitute separate kidnapping
offenses. 6 The appellate court disagreed and upheld the separate kidnapping
convictions.- On certiorari," the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and HELD,
petitioner was properly convicted of both kidnapping and rape because his
movement of the victims facilitated the sexual batteries and was not necessary,
inherent, or incidental to the assaults. 9
A misdemeanor at common law, kidnapping was defined as stealing a
person away from his own country and transporting him to another.' 0 Today's
1. 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983). See also FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1981).
2. 426 So. 2d at 964. See also FLA. STAT. § 787.01 (1981). Florida's kidnapping statute reads
as follows:
(1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or
imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent
to: 1. Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function.
Id. § 787.01(1)(a).
3. 426 So. 2d at 964.
4. Id.
5. Faison v. State, 399 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). In addition to appealing his two
kidnapping convictions, petitioner challenged the simultaneous conviction for both first degree
burglary (burglary of the second victim's home and an assault upon her within) and sexual
battery (which constituted the same assault involved in the burglary charge). Id. at 22.
6. Id. at 20.
7. Id. at 21. The court, however, vacated the adjudication of guilt for the second rape
because it constituted the assault in the first degree burglary conviction. Id. at 22.
8. See FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (granting the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction to
resolve conflicting district court decisions). The holding in Faison v. State, 399 So. 2d 19 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1981), conflicted with Harkins v. State, 380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980). 426
So. 2d at 964.
9. 426 So. 2d at 966. The court also held that separate convictions for first degree
burglary and sexual battery, which constituted the assault in the burglary count, were
proper, quashing the district court's decision on this point. Id. at 965.
10. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 comment at 210 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980). See also Note, Kidnapping in Iowa: Movements Incidental to Sexual Abuse,
67 IowA L. REv. 773, 775 (1982).
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statutory definitions are significantly more expansive and eliminate substantial
asportation requirements." The Model Penal Code (Code), however, would
narrow this expansive scope by requiring movement of "a substantial distance"
and confinement for "a substantial period in a place of isolation."'12 Otherwise
similar to the Code, Florida's kidnapping statute omits these substantial
distance and time requirements. 3
Kidnapping statutes punish the wrongful taking or confining of a victim in
various dangerous situations, including kidnapping to facilitate a felony. 14 In
interpreting the crime of kidnapping to facilitate a felony, state courts have
adopted either an "any movement" or an "incidental" approach.' 5 The any
movement analysis leads to a finding of kidnapping if the defendant moved
the victim any distance.18 Courts adopting the incidental approach recognize
kidnapping only when movement or confinement of the victim was not an
integral part of the separate offense.' 7
11.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT.

§ 609.25 (1980).
12. MODEL PENAL
provides in part:

CODE

§ 787.01

(1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 21-3420

(1981); MINN. STAT.

§ 212.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980). The provision

Kidnapping"
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place
of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found,
or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with
any of the following purposes: (a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or
hostage; or (b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or (c) to
inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or (d) to interfere with
the performance of any governmental or political function.
Id.

13. Compare FLA. STAT. § 787.01 (1981) with MODEL

PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1980).
14. See supra statutes cited note II.See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 comment at 229;
Note, supra note 10, at 777.
15. The "any movement" standard is typified by State v. Ayers, 198 Kan. 467, 426 P.2d
21 (1967) (removal of victim only 100-150 feet and detention for five minutes during assaults
constitutes kidnapping); State v. Morris, 281 Minn. 119, 160 N.W2d 715 (1968). But see
State v. Estes, 216 Kan. 582, 532 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1975) (questioning the decision made in
Ayers). The incidental approach is typified by People v. Daniels, 56 Cal. 2d 459, 364 P.2d 241
(1961) (movements incidental to crime did not constitute separate offense of aggravated kidnapping because risk of harm remained same); State v. Ginardi, 111 N.J. Super. 435, 268
A.d 534 (incidental movement analysis implicated when more than brief movement of the
victim is involved), aff'd, 57 N.J. 438, 273 A.2d 353 (1970); People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266,
282 N.Y.S.2d 519, 229 N.E.2d 2061 (1967) (defendant's asportation of victims between New
York City boroughs to commit rape is not kidnapping). But see State v. Rabon, 115 Ariz.
App. 45, 563 P.2d 301 (1977) (rejecting Daniels and finding movement of any distance
constitutes kidnapping); People v. Cassidy, 363 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1975) (criticizing Lombardi,
and finding it dependent upon old statute, and hence not controlling).
16. State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 342, 380 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (transportation from trailer to
porch to commit rape held to be kidnapping), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 46 (1963); State v.
Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 338-39, 426 A-2d 298, 304 (1979) (court held that movement and restraint of victim to commit another crime is sufficient for charge of kidnapping).
17. State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981) (movement of victim from mall to restroom was not incidental to sexual abuse, but provided means of avoiding detection); People
v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N,Y,.2d 793, (asportation was incidental to
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Construing a statute similar to Florida's,18 the Minnesota Supreme Court

adopted the any movement analysis in State v. Morris.19 The court upheld
petitioner's kidnapping and assault convictions for attacking his victim on the
sidewalk and pushing her up nearby steps to assault her.20 The victim was
moved 100 to 150 feet, and was detained five minutes. 21 The court, applying
the statute literally, noted the legislature's omission of the substantial time and
distance requirementsl - from the statute. Rejecting the incidental approach of
other jurisdictions, the Minnesota court found these omissions reflected legislative intent that such limited movement and confinement should constitute kid2
napping. 3
The Kansas Supreme Court decision of State v. Buggs24 exemplifies the
incidental approach. The defendant in Buggs forced the victim from a store
parking lot back inside the empty store before robbing and raping her.25 The
court interpreted the Kansas kidnapping statute 6 to require proof that the
movement or confinement was neither inconsequential, nor merely incidental
to the commission of the other crime. 7 In addition, the movement must be
significantly independent of the other crime, facilitating the crime's commission or reducing the risk of detection. 2s The court noted that facilitation is
robbery, and it was unlikely that legislature intended kidnapping definition to include mere
incidental movement and restraint), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 (1965).
18. MINN. STAT. § 609.25, subd. 1 (1980) reads in part:
Whoever, for any of the following purposes, confines or removes from one place to
another, any person without his consent or, if he is under the age of 16 years, without
the consent of his parents or other legal custodian, is guilty of kidnapping ...
(2) To
facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; ....
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

281 Minn. 119, 160 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1968).
Id. at 119-20, 160 N.W.2d at 716.
Id. at 119, 160 N.W.2d at 716.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
281 Minn. at 122, 160 N.W.2d at 717-18.
219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976).
Id. at 205, 547 P.2d at 723-24.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3420 (1974) provides:

Kidnapping is the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, threat
or deception, with the intent to hold such person: (a) For ransom, or as a shield or
hostage; or (b) To facilitate flight or the commission of any crime; or (c) To inflict
bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another; or (d) To interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.
27.

219 Kan. at 216, 547 P.2d at 731. The Buggs test reads as follows:

[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission
of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes
the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of
detection.
Id.
28. Id.
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mofe than making commission of the other crime "convenient."2 9 Applying this
new standard to uphold the multiple convictions, the Buggs court determined
the victim's movement and confinement facilitated and were not incidental to
the rape and robbery. 30 In Kansas and other jurisdictions, courts have applied
the Buggs test discriminately, affirming kidnapping convictions only when the
movement or confinement clearly facilitated the furtherance of a different
felony.31
Florida courts initially employed a less elaborate standard than the incidental rule in interpreting the state's kidnapping statute.3 2 The courts defined
kidnapping as movement or confinement which is "neither inconsequential nor
inherent" in another felony. 33 In Simpkins v. State,34 the Florida First District
Court of Appeal reversed the kidnapping conviction of a defendant who had
pulled his victim from the bedroom to the living room before raping her. The
29. Id. at 215, 547 P.2d at 730.
30. Id. at 216-17, 547 P.2d at 751-32.
31. The Kansas Supreme Court applied the Buggs test in the following cases with
consistent results: State v. Mahlandt, 231 Kan. 665, 647 P.2d 1307 (1982) (robber who forced
.tore clerk into his car held guilty of kidnapping, even though victim escaped); State v.
Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 643 P.2d 154 (1982) (defendant's act of moving victim from living
room to bedroom, away from view and reach of other persons in the house, and then assaulting
victim was kidnapping); State v. Ferguson, 228 Kan. 522, 618 P.2d 1186 (1980) (defendant's
act of forcibly dragging victim from back room of a flower shop outside to a parking lot
before raping her was kidnapping); State v. Williams, 226 Kan. 688, 602 P.2d 1332 (1979)
(binding, gagging, and securing victims by placing chairs over them and a desk across door to
facilitate the defendant's flight is kidnapping); State v. Smith, 224 Kan. 662, 585 P.2d 1006
(1978) (forcing bank employee into basement while defendants fled constitutes kidnapping),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964 (1979).
Other jurisdictions have successfully applied the Buggs test, including Iowa. See, e.g.,
State v. Mead, 318 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 1982) (seizing burglary victim prior to snatching purse
from victim's daughter was not a confinement sufficient for kidnapping); State "v.
Knupp, 310
N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1981) (defendant who pulled victim into his car and drove six blocks
to a point under a bridge before assaulting her was guilty of kidnapping); State v. Rich, 305
N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981) (dragging victim into a deserted restroom and tying her up constitutes kidnapping).
32. See Harkins v. State, 380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980).
33. Id. at 528. Applying this standard, Florida courts often reached inconsistent results.
See, e.g., Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1982) (prisoners attempting escape found
guilty of kidnapping for confining guards with the intent to use them as hostages); Sorey v.
State, 419 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982) (robbers' act of tying up victims to facilitate
escape constitutes kidnapping); Dowdell v. State, 415 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (defendant who ordered victim from a parking lot into a restaurant and told victim to stay out
of sight as he opened the safe is guilty of kidnapping); Carron v. State, 414 So. 2d 288 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1982) (ordering victims into another room, tying victims, and placing them in a
bathtub involves kidnapping to facilitate armed robbery); Gilley v. State, 412 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1982) (dragging victim 90 feet from a car and raping victim is kidnapping to
facilitate a felony); Ayendes v. State, 385 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980) (escaped prisoner's
act of confining two victims in their home for one hour constitutes kidnapping with intent
to facilitate escape); Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980) (ordering office
employees into a bathroom and closing the door, committing a robbery, and then leaving does
not involve confinement sufficient to constitute kidnapping); Harkins v. State, 380 So. 2d 524
(Fla.5th D.C.A. 1980) (tying victim to bed before raping and murdering him includes confinement sufficient to involve kidnapping).
34. 395 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1981).
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court concluded that the victim's confinement and movement were essentially
indistinguishable from the sexual battery.3
Faced with facts similar to Simpkins, the instant court nevertheless upheld
the separate kidnapping conviction.3 The court adopted Buggs' incidental rule
and found petitioner's forcible dragging of victims to nearby rooms was more
than slight, inconsequential, or incidental to the subsequent sexual batteries.3 7
Furthermore the movements were not inherent in or necessary for the commission of the sexual assaults.38 Distinguishing Simpkins, the court noted that
the instant petitioner had relocated his victims to places of " 'relative seclusion,'" rendering the rapes easier to commit and reducing the risk of detection.39
The dissenting justice viewed the confinements and movements as incidental to the rapes and of insufficiently independent significance to constitute
kidnapping. 40 The dissent warned that the majority's literal application of
the statute destroys the law's deterrent effect and could lead to prosecutorial
abuse and stacking of criminal convictions for a single offense. 41 While agreeing that Buggs was the proper test for interpreting Florida's kidnapping
statute, the dissent concluded it was erroneously applied in the instant de42
cision.
In interpreting Florida's kidnapping statute, the instant court correctly
adopted the incidental test for determining when a single felonious transaction
gives rise to the separate offense of kidnapping. Although the statute is based
upon the Code's definition of kidnapping, the Florida Legislature omitted the
Code's substantial asportation and confinement requirements. 43 Under Morris,
this statutory omission could suggest a legislative intent to use the "any movements" approach. 44 Under Buggs, however, such deletion does not necessarily
preclude application of the Code's intended incidental approach. 45 The Buggs
court considered the Kansas Legislature's omission of these requirements, and
opted for the more flexible incidental rule. 46 In Buggs, it was crucial that the
movement of the victim facilitated the separate offense rather than merely
making it more convenient.47 Deletion of the asportation requirement from

35. Id. at 626.
36. Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1983).
37. Id. at 966.
88. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 969 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Id. at 968. The Justice agreed that the crime of sexual battery was a separate offense
from the crime of burglary. He dissented, however, from the majority's views concerning the
two kidnapping convictions. Id. at 967.
42. Id. at 968.
43. See FLORIDA HousE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUsTICE, REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE
§ 787.01 (1975). The Committee's comments say Florida's new kidnapping provision was
taken in part from the MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1.
44. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
45. 219 Kan. at 214, 547 P.2d at 730.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Buggs court provided further guidance for the application of its test by dis-
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the statute did not alter the meaning of the retained -term "facilitate."4' 8 The
instant court's adoption of the incidental test is therefore appropriate.
Confusing "facilitation" with "convenience", however, the instant court
applied the Buggs test without necessary "surgical precision." 49 When
petitioner dragged his victim from full view of a large window to a back room
before raping her, the subsequent crime became less detectable. This assault
arguably involved a kidnapping because the movement facilitated the rape.
By contrast, moving the second victim from the kitchen to the bedroom of an
empty house did nothing to assist the rape's commission, reduce the likelihood
of detection, or increase the risk of harm to the victim.50 Petitioner's movement
of the second victim was for his own convenience, thus failing the adopted
Buggs test for kidnapping.
While the guidelines of the Buggs test may alleviate lower court confusion,
the instant court's application of that test dropped the kidnapping threshold
to a questionably low level. Judicial application of the incidental test necessarily requires discretion on a case-by-case basis. The precedent set by the
instant court, however, may create inconsistency and signal tolerance for
stacking of felony convictions 5' for a single criminal transaction. Under the
instant ruling, a mugger who pulls his victim into a nearby alley before
snatching her purse may be charged with the life felony of kidnapping.52 Because the instant decision suggests that virtually any movement accompanying
a felony will constitute kidnapping, rational implementation of Florida's kidnapping statute now rests within the broad discretion of state prosecutors and
sentencing judges.
JANE ALBERTSON
tinguishing movements and confinements which constitute kidnapping from "incidental"
movements:
For example: A standstill robbery on the street is not a kidnapping; the forced removal
of the victim to a dark alley for robbery is. The removal of a rape victim from room
to room within a dwelling solely for the convenience and comfort of the rapist is not
a kidnapping, the removal from a public place to a place of seclusion is. The forced
direction of a store clerk to cross the store to open a cash register is not a kidnapping; locking him in a cooler to facilitate escape is.
Id. at 216, 547 P.2d at 731.
48. Id. at 214, 547 P.2d at 730.
49. 426 So. 2d at 969 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. See 219 Kan. at 216, 547 P.2d at 731.
51. 426 So. 2d at 968 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. On the other hand, rapists and robbers facing kidnapping convictions for incidental
movements will have nothing to lose by abducting their victims to more remote and
dangerous locations,
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